High-Level, "Tenured" Lawyers by Merrill, Thomas W.
HIGH-LEVEL, "TENURED" LAWYERS 
THOMAS W. MERRILL* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Government lawyers can be broadly categorized as either political or civil 
service appointees. The political appointees constitute a thin layer at or near 
the top of the hierarchy of government lawyers. They include, most promi- 
nently, presidential appointees-"Officers of the United States" who must be 
nominated and confirmed by the Senate prior to their appointment.1 They also 
include a variety of lesser lawyers who are exempt from most of the civil service 
laws.2 Such exempt "inferior Officers" include, for example, the lawyers in the 
White House Counsel's office and so-called "Schedule C" lawyers who hold 
positions "of a confidential or policy-determining nature" scattered throughout 
the bureaucracy.3 
The civil service lawyers form the much larger base of the hierarchy below 
the thin top layer. They shall be referred to here as "tenured lawyers," be- 
cause, as in the case of tenured academics, they have an expectation of contin- 
ued government employment unless and until they are terminated for cause 
following cumbersome due process formalities.4 These tenure rights, which are 
created by the civil service laws and regulations,5 do not confer the right to con- 
tinue in any particular job or function. Tenured lawyers can be removed from 
their position if their agency is abolished or is subject to a reduction in force.6 
Generally speaking, however, they cannot be fired, demoted, or have their pay 
reduced unless they have been proven guilty of some dereliction of duty.7 
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1. U.S. CONST. art. II, ? 2, cl.2. 
2. See 5 C.F.R. ? 213.3301 (1998). 
3. Id. 
4. In fact, the leading due process authorities include cases spawned by adverse employment ac- 
tion taken against both civil service employees and teachers working for public institutions of higher 
learning. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (academic employee); Perry v. Sinder- 
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (same); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (civil service employee). 
5. See Arnett, 416 U.S. at 140-46. 
6. In which case they have certain priority rights to employment elsewhere in the government. 
See 5 C.F.R. ? 359.601 (1998). 
7. See generally ROBERT M. O'NEIL, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 122-23 (2d ed. 1993) 
(summarizing procedures). 
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Although most tenured lawyers perform tasks that would be regarded as 
routine from the perspective of high political theory, at the upper echelons of 
the civil service, there are a significant number of lawyers-members of what is 
called the Senior Executive Service-who hold positions of significant respon- 
sibility. In the Justice Department, for example, there is a "mixing zone" of 
lawyers at the bottom of the thin political layer and the top of the civil service 
base-roughly speaking, the layer consisting of deputies to presidential ap- 
pointees-where some lawyers are political appointees and some are civil ser- 
vants, and each performs comparable functions. 
One example of such a mixing zone is provided by the office in the Justice 
Department with which I am the most familiar, that of the Solicitor General. 
The Solicitor General's office represents the United States before the Supreme 
Court and supervises appellate litigation in the lower courts. The office is 
headed by the Solicitor General, who is a presidential appointee and is the 
fourth-highest ranking officer in the Justice Department. Immediately below 
the Solicitor General are four Deputy Solicitors General. One, the Deputy So- 
licitor General and Counselor to the Solicitor General, informally known as the 
"Political Deputy," is a non-career member of the Senior Executive Service. 
The other three deputies all hold what are called career-reserved vositions in 
the Senior Executive Service, that is, they are tenured civil servants. Although 
the Political Deputy becomes Acting Solicitor General when the Solicitor Gen- 
eral resigns or is disqualified, when both the Solicitor General and the Political 
Deputy have resigned or are disqualified, which happens not infrequently, es- 
pecially during the transition between administrations, one of the tenured 
deputies becomes the Acting Solicitor General.9 For most day-to-day purposes, 
such as arguing cases in the Supreme Court and approving the content of the 
briefs filed in the Court, the Political Deputy and the tenured deputies perform 
indistinguishable tasks and have the same degree of responsibility. 
The functional justification for using civil service lawyers to perform such 
high-level tasks has received very little scholarly attention. A better under- 
standing of the rationale for having such lawyers is sorely needed, because civil 
service lawyers are often the target of criticism. As James Q. Wilson has noted, 
"[n]o politician ever lost votes by denouncing the bureaucracy,"'1 and the im- 
pulse to poor-mouth the bureaucracy often carries over to include lawyer- 
8. On the distinction between non-career and career-reserved Senior Executive Service ("SES") 
appointments, see 5 U.S.C. ? 3134 (1994); 5 C.F.R. ? 214.410 (1998). By law, no more than 10% of 
SES positions can be filled by political appointees. 
9. For example, in the transition period between the Reagan and the Bush Administrations, a 
tenured Deputy, William Bryson, served as Acting Solicitor General for almost half a year. Among 
the sensitive tasks he discharged during this period of time included the filing of the government's brief 
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), which asked the Court to overrule its 
decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Bryson served again as Acting Solicitor General in the 
transition between the Bush and Clinton Administrations. He is now a judge on the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
10. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY 
DO IT 235 (1989). 
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bureaucrats. Generally speaking, two types of criticism have been made,1' both 
having some force. 
The first is based on the lack of accountability of high-level tenured lawyers. 
Presidential elections occur at four-year intervals, and, as we know, they often 
result in a change of party control of the White House. When this happens, 
new presidential appointees are installed in the departments and agencies, and 
there is often a discernible shift in the direction of policy. Presidential appoint- 
ees can usually count on political lawyers to carry out these new policies. But 
high-level tenured lawyers are often regarded with suspicion. Because they 
have tenure, they cannot be removed as a consequence of the result of the elec- 
tions, even if they are suspected of hostility toward the policies of the incoming 
administration. High-level tenured lawyers thus can pose an impediment to 
democratic change. 
The second criticism is based on the inefficiencies associated with any sys- 
tem of tenure.12 It is extremely difficult to remove tenured civil servants from 
office.13 Their security, combined with relatively little room for significant pay 
differentials or bonuses based on performance,14 eliminates much of the incen- 
tive for high productivity. Thus, as will be familiar to anyone who has partici- 
pated in debates over academic tenure, one considerable cost of any such sys- 
tem is that tenured employees may behave opportunistically by shirking or 
performing only the minimal amount of work necessary to avoid dismissal or 
demotion. Granting tenure to high-level lawyers may therefore impair the 
general efficiency of the workforce. 
The often unstated conclusion drawn from these criticisms is that we should 
expand the use of political lawyers in performing high-level tasks and either 
eliminate tenure for lawyers or push the use of tenured lawyers further down 
the legal hierarchy.15 However, this conclusion presupposes that there are no 
significant countervailing reasons for having high-level tenured lawyers. In this 
essay, I will seek to identify and evaluate the most plausible justifications for 
using tenured lawyers to perform high-level tasks within the executive branch 
11. See generally RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 
SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY 1-10 (1994) (summarizing the accountability and pro- 
ductivity critiques of bureaucracies). 
12. For a general discussion of the efficiency arguments for and against employment tenure, see 
Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 
EMORY L.J. 1097 (1989). 
13. It has been reported that "[d]uring fiscal year 1990, of well more than a million and a half cov- 
ered federal employees, only 370 were removed and 128 were demoted for poor performance." 
O'NEIL, supra note 7, at 122. This means that 99.97% of covered civil servants sailed through the year 
with no adverse employment action against them. 
14. See JOHNSON & LIBECAP, supra note 11, at 170. 
15. I am here concerned primarily with the use of tenured lawyers in high-level positions that en- 
tail the exercise of a significant measure of discretionary authority. With respect to lower-level civil 
servants, the accountability critique carries less force, but the efficiency concern may loom large. In- 
deed, it is possible that the efficiency concerns warrant significant modifications of the tenure system 
for lower-level employees. See id. at 170-71. After all, universities do not grant full tenure rights to 
administrative personnel and maintenance workers, presumably because the efficiency costs would be 
too high. 
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legal system. Uncovering such justifications does not, of course, dispose of the 
question of whether or to what extent we should deploy tenured lawyers to per- 
form high-level roles. The accountability and inefficiency critiques must be 
given their due before reaching any final evaluation of how best to structure the 
government. Before we jump on the bandwagon in support of a return to the 
patronage system, however, it is important to try to develop the best case for 
preserving a significant role for upper-level civil service lawyers. 
In Part II, I consider the traditional functional justification for the civil 
service, which I will call the impartiality argument. This justification posits that 
tenured employees are preferred to political or patronage employees because 
they will discharge their duties free of favoritism or partisan bias. Without 
suggesting that this justification is wholly meritless, I will argue that in our post- 
Legal Realist Age it is not a very powerful one as applied to high-level tenured 
lawyers. At the upper reaches of the legal hierarchy, one person's political bias 
is another person's democratically sanctioned policy change. The idea that 
tenured lawyers are more impartial in their discernment of the requirements of 
the law therefore provides a rationale that is probably too weak to overcome 
the accountability and efficiency concerns created by any system of tenure. 
In Part III, I turn to a different rationale for tenure systems, one based on 
the tendency of a such systems to encourage employees to adopt a long-term 
perspective about the needs of the institution they serve. Tenured lawyers tend 
to be repeat players rather than short termers, and as such they have an incen- 
tive to build and preserve the institutional capital of the Executive Branch. Be- 
cause of their efforts in building this institutional capital, the Executive Branch 
is arguably a stronger and more effective instrument for realizing the goals of 
each successive administration than would be the case if every newly elected 
President had to assemble a cadre of lawyers from scratch as under the patron- 
age system. I consider this rationale a more powerful justification for using 
tenured lawyers in certain high-level positions, one sufficiently important to 
warrant some compromise with the accountability and efficiency arguments fa- 
voring the use of at-will employees. 
In Part IV, I briefly consider how the institutional capital justification for 
tenured lawyers might fit into the on-going debate over how best to conduct in- 
vestigations into alleged criminal wrongdoing by high-level executive branch 
officials-the problem of Watergate, the Iran-Contra affair, the Whitewater in- 
vestigation, and now the Monica Lewinsky scandal. The current solution to this 
problem embodied in the Ethics in Government Act-the appointment of an 
"Independent Counsel" by an Article III tribunal-has probably given rise to 
more difficulties than the problem it is designed to solve. The source of these 
difficulties is that Independent Counsels combine the worst features of tenured 
lawyers and political lawyers. Like tenured lawyers, they lack political ac- 
countability and are prone to inefficiency. Like political lawyers, however, they 
also lack the long-term perspective that repeat players enjoy. I suggest that a 
superior solution to the problem of criminal investigations of high government 
officials would be to have such investigations conducted by tenured lawyers 
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within the Justice Department who are at least indirectly accountable to 
elected officials. 
II 
THE IMPARTIALITY JUSTIFICATION 
The most familiar rationale that has been advanced for the civil service is 
what I will call the impartiality justification: Tenured employees are more 
likely to discharge their duties without having their judgment influenced by 
political or partisan considerations. This is the reason most commonly cited in 
support of the abolition of the Jacksonian spoils system and the creation of the 
civil service in the Pendleton Act of 1883.16 The ideal of administrative impar- 
tiality probably reached its apogee with the "scientific management" school of 
government associated with Woodrow Wilson17 and Herbert Hoover,18 and car- 
ried over into the celebration of administrative "expertise" that was a promi- 
nent aspect of the New Deal.19 It remains today the officially recognized ra- 
20 tionale for giving government employees tenure protection.2 
In many areas of public administration, the ideal of impartiality continues 
to hold sway. Most people would probably agree that new drug applications, 
motor vehicle safety standards, DNA testing standards, and changes in the 
money supply should be determined with at least significant input from persons 
chosen for their objectivity and technical expertise rather than their political 
views. Indeed, Justice Stephen Breyer has recently written an influential book 
arguing for the creation of a super-agency of insulated experts to establish na- 
tional priorities for the regulation of environmental risks.1 So impartiality as 
an ideal for government employees is far from dead. 
Underlying the impartiality ideal is the distinction between political and 
nonpolitical decisionmaking. According to the scientific management concep- 
tion, politics has its proper role in setting the basic direction of policy. But 
once the policy is fixed, the details of implementation and application of that 
policy should be determined by impartial experts. Thus, in order to foster and 
protect the ideal of objective implementation of policy, we have created the 
civil service system. 
Whatever its status in fields that intersect with scientific and technological 
expertise, the impartiality ideal is under considerable stress as applied to high- 
16. See generally ARI HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT 1965-1883 (1968); JOHNSON & LIBECAP, supra note 11, at 12-41. 
17. See Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887). 
18. Hoover's endorsement of scientific management was most pronounced in his roles as adminis- 
trator and chair of various commissions devoted to administrative reform. See PAUL C. LIGHT, THE 
TIDES OF REFORM 21-25 (1997). 
19. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-24 (1938). 
20. See 5 C.F.R. ? 214.402(b)(2) (1998) (noting that positions in the SES must be reserved for ca- 
reer appointees when necessary "to ensure impartiality, or the public's confidence in the impartiality, 
of the Government"). 
21. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993). 
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level government lawyers.22 In the legal context, the impartiality vision presup- 
poses some form of "legal right-answerism." That is, one must believe that 
there is an activity called "politics" that consists of making or creating new 
rules, and that there is a distinctive activity called "law" that consists of discov- 
ering or identifying preexisting rules, and one must further believe that objec- 
tive and appropriately trained lawyers can agree in most instances on the right 
answer to the question "what is the law with respect to x?" One implication of 
this perspective is that those engaged in rule creation should be politically ac- 
countable: Preferably they should be elected officials (members of Congress or 
the President and Vice President), but at the very least they should be answer- 
able to such elected officials. In contrast, those engaged in discovering or iden- 
tifying existing rules should be insulated from political influences in order to 
keep their vision clear of extraneous factors clouding their ability to see the 
right answer. 
This strong distinction between politics and law is a staple of our legal cul- 
ture and its influence is not hard to find.23 Yet there is reason to think that its 
influence is on the wane. We live in a post-Legal Realist Age, when most legal 
commentators take it for granted that law cannot be disentangled from politics 
and that legal judgment is driven by the political beliefs of the decisionmaker.2 
This disparagement of the politics/law distinction is most prominently asso- 
ciated with (or at least acknowledged in) the work of critical and post-modern 
scholars, but it is by no means confined to them. It is also one of the lessons of 
recent struggles over the confirmation of judges. The struggles started with the 
Bork confirmation hearings, where the nominee sought to cast himself as an 
anti-Realist who would always enforce the law according to its "original in- 
tent."25 A majority of the Senate and virtually the entire Democratic estab- 
lishment scoffed at this profession of faith, and succeeded in portraying Bork's 
commitment to law as a cover for a conservative political agenda. Not to be 
outdone, the Republicans, once they took control of the Senate after 1994, have 
sought to portray Clinton's judicial nominees as activists bent on transforming 
22. When I refer to government lawyers, I am speaking only of those employees who perform 
roles as legal advocates for and advisors to various government agencies. Insofar as legally trained 
employees serve in a decisionmaking capacity within government agencies, the impartiality ideal ar- 
guably takes on greater significance. The clearest example would be the cadre of government lawyers 
known as Administrative Law Judges. Extensive measures are taken to assure the independence of 
ALJs from political control and oversight, see, for example 5 U.S.C. ? 557(d)(1) (1994) (prohibiting ex 
parte communications), in order to promote the sense they are impartial and hence worthy of being 
regarded as "judge-like." I do not consider in this paper the arguably distinct rationale for assuring the 
impartiality of these lawyers. 
23. It is, for example, the vision that underlies the famous Chevron decision in administrative law. 
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). There, the 
political function is identified as belonging to elected politicians and their political appointees, while 
the rule discovering function is identified as belonging to the Article III judiciary. See Thomas W. 
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1088-91 (1997). 
24. I do not number myself among the extreme skeptics about the possibility of legal knowledge, 
at least in most instances. But that is a subject for another day. 
25. For the apologia, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990). 
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26 
the law to suit their own liberal ideological commitments.2 We have now 
reached the point where few elected politicians believe that a lawyer who is a 
member of the opposing political party can distinguish between politics and 
law. 
The spread of Legal Realist ideas leads to a conception of the role of the 
government lawyer that devalues impartiality. Again, we do not have to scour 
the literature of the left to find support for this proposition. It is fully revealed 
in an essay by Geoff Miller, a conservative law and economics scholar, about 
whether it is ethically proper for tenured government lawyers to adopt a view 
of the law's requirements at odds with the policy preferences of their politically 
accountable superiors.27 Miller argues that this kind of independent judgment 
is improper: 
Although the public interest as a reified concept may not be ascertainable, the Consti- 
tution establishes procedures for approximating that ideal through election, appoint- 
ment, confirmation, and legislation. Nothing systematic empowers government law- 
yers to substitute their individual conceptions of the good for the priorities and 
objectives established through these governmental processes. 
Implicit in Miller's account is the same proposition endorsed by the left: 
that "law" does not exist separate and distinct from politics. To the contrary, 
judgments about law are ultimately political judgments. Because our Constitu- 
tion establishes a framework of elections, legislation, and administration by of- 
ficers accountable to the President for establishing political judgments, the 
proper role of the government lawyer is faithfully to carry out the political in- 
structions received from superiors, not to interpose objections based on the 
lawyer's reading of the requirements of "the law." 
This theoretical critique of government lawyers exercising independent 
judgment about the requirements of the law has been extended to the Solicitor 
General's office by John McGinnis, another conservative scholar.2 McGinnis 
argues that the President is entitled to his own understanding of the meaning of 
the Constitution, and that the Solicitor General, as a subordinate officer to the 
President, should function as a "paladin who attempts to impress the Presi- 
dent's undiluted constitutional vision upon the Court."30 Prudential concerns 
about winning cases and maintaining good will among the constitutional 
branches, according to McGinnis, should take a back seat to advocacy of the 
President's constitutional vision. 
Not surprisingly, McGinnis views the tenured lawyers in the Solictor Gen- 
eral's Office as an impediment to reorienting the Office in this fashion. He ex- 
26. See Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target 'Judicial Activism'; Conservatives Block Nominees; 
Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, Why 
Bork is Still a Verb in Politics, 10 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, ? 4 at 3. 
27. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987). 
28. Id. at 1295. 
29. See John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in Constitu- 
tional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992). 
30. Id. at 807. 
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plains the recalcitrance of these lawyers in terms of theories of bureaucratic 
behavior. The tenured lawyers in the Solicitor General's Office, by professing 
fidelity to Supreme Court precedents-which they claim a unique capacity to 
interpret-are aggrandizing their own power and influence within the bureauc- 
racy. Although McGinnis does not suggest that all tenured lawyers in the So- 
licitor General's Office be fired and replaced with political appointees,32 he 
does recommend that new civil service hires be screened for their 
"jurisprudential views," noting that "[t]he President's jurisprudence would be 
advanced more readily by a staff whose inclinations and methodology are 
closely aligned with the President's philosophy."33 Thus, McGinnis, like Miller, 
sees no role for the exercise of autonomous legal judgment by civil service law- 
yers. 
The loss of faith in impartiality as an ideal of government lawyering is not 
confined to theory; it has also been extended to practice. Presidents appear in- 
creasingly to share the view that all administration of the law is political. 
Starting with President Nixon, if not before, the ratio of political appointees to 
tenured appointees has steadily increased.34 The rationale for this increasing 
penetration of political appointees has been to assure "control" of the adminis- 
trative process by the President. Specifically, tenured lawyers are assumed to 
make decisions based on political criteria, and are further assumed to harbor 
the political values of the outgoing administration (or of the Congress, if it is 
controlled by the other political party). To counteract this perceived threat of 
"sabotage" by civil service lawyers, larger and larger numbers of political law- 
yers are being added to the administrative structure. 
This process of increased political oversight is vividly illustrated by the fa- 
mous Bob Jones University case35 that arose in the early years of the Reagan 
presidency. Bob Jones was a fundamentalist Christian university that followed 
certain racially discriminatory practices. When the IRS, enforcing a policy im- 
posed on it by the courts and having scant textual basis, revoked the school's 
tax exempt status, the school sought review of the policy by the Supreme Court. 
The Solicitor General, Rex Lee, disqualified himself from participating in the 
31. See id. at 810-11. Other commentators have observed that the independence of the Solicitor 
General's office is related to the fact that "the bulk of the Solicitor General's staff consists of civil 
service employees who are not subject to removal for political or ideological reasons." Richard G. 
Wilkins, An Officer and An Advocate: The Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1167, 
1170 (1988). The traditional view, of course, regarded such independence as a good thing. 
32. He notes that it would violate the civil service laws to dismiss incumbent lawyers "for their ju- 
risprudential views." McGinnis, supra note 29, at 812 n.70. 
33. Id. at 812. 
34. See James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy- 
Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, in THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE ADMINIS- 
TRATIVE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE LATE 20TH CENTURY, 144-45 (Richard J. Stillman III 
& Frederick C. Mosher eds., 1989). 
35. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). For an account of the internal 
politics in the Justice Department regarding the case and the role of Acting Solicitor General Wallace, 
see LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 51- 
64 (1987). 
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case. Acting in his place was Lawrence Wallace, senior Deputy Solicitor Gen- 
eral and the quintessential tenured civil service lawyer.36 
At the certiorari stage, Wallace argued that the IRS's policy was correct. 
However, after review was granted and certain members of Congress criticized 
the IRS's position, a group of political appointees in the Justice Department 
known as the "Bob Jones team" launched an effort to get the Department to 
change its position. Attorney General Smith eventually sided with this group 
and ordered Wallace to file a brief supporting the university. Wallace did so, 
but only after including a footnote describing the brief as stating the "position 
of the United States" but not that of "the Acting Solicitor General."37 Wallace 
thus publicly signaled that the legal argument of the Administration was not 
endorsed by the tenured lawyers in the Solicitor General's office. 
The brief and the footnote sparked a firestorm of controversy, as the Rea- 
gan Administration was castigated by the New York Times and other voices of 
the opposition for supporting "racism."38 Given the outcry, it is not surprising 
that the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, reaffirmed the policy of 
the IRS. The vote was 8-1, with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting. The "Bob 
Jones team" had suffered a resounding defeat. 
The response of the political appointees who had instigated this debacle 
was, of course, to blame Wallace. They argued that Wallace, as a holdover 
from prior administrations, was hostile to the philosophy of judicial restraint 
espoused by the Reagan Administration and was so committed to judicial ac- 
tivism in support of civil rights that he could not be trusted fairly to represent 
the views of the Administration to the Court. The upshot was that Wallace was 
reassigned to handle matters other than civil rights cases. More significantly, 
the Administration created a new position, the Political Deputy, who would 
henceforth act in any case in which the Solicitor General was disqualified. 
Thus, the perceived political bias of the career attorney was solved by expan- 
sion of the number of political appointees in the office. 
One could of course draw the opposite lesson from Bob Jones, and conclude 
that the episode shows that political lawyers should heed the advice of tenured 
lawyers if they want to stay out of trouble. Wallace, on this view, was the legal 
"expert" who had an accurate sense of how willing the Court would be to repu- 
diate the IRS's policy on discriminatory educational institutions. Wallace's re- 
sistance arguably should have been regarded as a warning to the political law- 
yers that they were embarking on a suicide mission. 
Yet the enduring lesson of Bob Jones has not been a restoration of faith in 
the judgment of tenured lawyers. Rather, it has been that career lawyers are a 
36. Wallace started working in the Solicitor General's office in 1968 and holds the record for the 
most oral arguments before the Court in the Twentieth Century. See Al Kamen, Milestone for Wallace 
Today at Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1997, at A17. 
37. CAPLAN, supra note 35, at 51. 
38. See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Ronald Crow, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1982, at B1; Tom Wicker, Subsi- 
dizing Racism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan, 12, 1982, at A15; Tax-Exempt Racism Revisited, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 
1982, at A22. 
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dangerous political fifth column who should be carefully subordinated to politi- 
cally accountable lawyers. For example, former Solicitor General Charles 
Fried, in his reflections on the Bob Jones episode, agrees that the government's 
brief was "wrongheaded."39 But he also concurs in the assessment that the posi- 
tions urged by career lawyers in the office were "clogged with commitments 
and assumptions that were in fact political," and he therefore endorses the con- 
clusion that a Political Deputy was needed.4 Significantly, although the Clin- 
ton Administration has been less aggressive in subordinating the career lawyers 
in the Solicitor General's Office than the Reagan and Bush Administrations,41 
it has not made any move to abolish the position of the Political Deputy. 
Whatever the correct lessons to be drawn from the Bob Jones episode, it is 
clear that there are occasions when the policy views of tenured lawyers can cre- 
ate a problem for Presidents. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") 
serves as a good illustration. There is no doubt that career lawyers working for 
EPA tend to be strongly committed to aggressive enforcement of the environ- 
mental laws. This is partly a function of self-selection: Young attorneys who 
choose to make a career of service with EPA are typically motivated in part by 
their personal attachment to environmental values. It is also partially a func- 
tion of the close relationship that often develops between career EPA lawyers 
and lawyers for environmental groups and congressional staffers who are sym- 
pathetic to the environmental cause. Thus, an administration that decides it is 
appropriate to adopt a policy that balances environmental protection against 
other economic goals is likely to find that these tenured lawyers are, at best, 
unenthusiastic about such an accomodationist policy and, at worst, that they ac- 
tively work to subvert it.42 The only solution to such obstruction would appear 
to be to increase the level of penetration of political lawyers into the bureauc- 
racy. 
39. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER & LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND 
ACCOUNT 29 (1991). 
40. Fried also offers the view that if there had been a Political Deputy in place when the episode 
arose "there might even have been some small chance that the Bob Jones brief would never have been 
filed." Id. at 28. Fried suggests, in other words, that a Political Deputy, like the career Deputy, would 
have seen the folly of switching sides and supporting Bob Jones-but would have had more credibility 
in talking the departmental activists out of doing so. This is possible-the Political Deputies on the 
whole have been a very impressive collection of lawyers, and have enjoyed the respect of both political 
appointees and career lawyers. But the immediate lesson drawn from Bob Jones was not that a Politi- 
cal Deputy was needed in order to constrain the ill-considered impulses of political appointees, but the 
exact opposite: that it was important to make the Office of the Solicitor General more responsive to 
the wishes of political appointees. 
41. During the Reagan and Bush years, vacancies that occurred within the ranks of the career 
Deputies were filled by appointing persons from outside the Office. These were academics or private 
practitioners who served fairly short terms of office (three years, typically) and then returned to their 
prior walks of life. Arguably, these Deputies (including the author), being relative short-termers, func- 
tioned somewhat more like the Political Deputy than the traditional civil service Deputies had done. 
The Clinton Justice Department, in contrast, has filled vacancies among the tenured Deputies in the 
traditional manner by promoting attorneys from within the Office. 
42. See B. Dan Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Act Enforcements, 
82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213 (1988) (finding that EPA bureaucrats continued to bring enforcement ac- 
tions even after the Reagan Administration installed political appointees hostile to such actions). 
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In sum, impartiality appears to be an enfeebled justification for utilizing 
tenured lawyers in high-level government positions. The crux of the problem is 
a declining faith in law as something that exists and can be discovered inde- 
pendently of political values. If one believes that law cannot be divorced from 
politics, then the meaning of law becomes something that should be settled at 
the ballot box or through other political processes, not in the law library. If the 
meaning of law is to be settled through the ballot box, then what we need are 
government lawyers who respect the results of elections, not government law- 
yers who exercise impartial judgment about the requirements of the law. What 
we need, in other words, are more political lawyers in high-level positions. 
III 
THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPITAL JUSTIFICATION 
A second and less commonly encountered justification for the civil service 
is based on what I will call the institutional capital argument. This justification 
focuses not on the independence of tenured employees, but rather on their lon- 
gevity in office. Because tenured employees often make government employ- 
ment a career, they tend to adopt a longer-term perspective than that charac- 
teristic of political appointees, who expect to remain in office only for the 
duration of one administration (if that). This longer-term perspective of ten- 
ured employees translates into certain behaviors that enhance the reputation of 
their office in the eyes of other governmental actors, and hence make the office 
a more effective instrument for realizing the policy objectives of the incumbent 
administration, whatever those objectives may happen to be. 
It is well known that political appointees have a very short tenure-about 
two years on average.43 They are "in-and-outers."44 Tenured employees, in 
contrast, particularly at the more senior level, often serve in government for 
their entire careers.45 This longer-term, multi-administration service gives high- 
level tenured lawyers a perspective arguably more attuned to the limits and the 
needs of government as an institution. As James Pfiffner has observed: 
[P]residential appointees [want] to make their mark quickly and to move on, either to 
a higher position in the government or back to the private sector to make more 
money. Much of the appointees' agendas are driven by the mandate to reelect a 
president or to leave a good record to run on for the partisan heir-apparent. 
43. Pfiffner, supra note 34, at 149. 
44. Id. 
45. Largely because government salaries have not kept pace with private sector salaries, fewer 
tenured lawyers are making a career of government service than was true in an earlier generation. 
The consequence is that many civil service lawyers have time horizons not much longer than the typi- 
cal political lawyer. Two factors offset the effect of this more rapid turnover, however. First, this 
short-termism is largely confined to entry-level legal positions. The civil service lawyers promoted to 
higher-level positions still tend to be careerists. Second, the culture of the civil service continues to be 
shaped and maintained by employees who have a long-term perspective on institutional service, and 
entry-level employees tend to assimilate the values instilled by this culture, even if they stay around 
only a few years. 
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Career executives, in contrast, have a longer-term perspective. They will still be op- 
erating programs and administering agencies after the political birds of passage have 
left. This causes them to pay attention to the health of institutions and to the integrity 
of the processes that assure nonpartisan implementation of the laws. 
The longer-term perspective of tenured lawyers suggests that the critical 
distinction between political lawyers and tenured lawyers is not so much one of 
partisan politics versus neutral expertise, but rather one of different loyalties. 
To put the contrast in the broadest possible terms, the political appointee is 
loyal to the President, that is, the current incumbent in the office, while the civil 
servant is loyal to the presidency, that is, the institution that includes not only 
the incumbent but also all past and future Presidents. The fact that their pri- 
mary loyalty is to the institution rather than the person suggests that tenured 
lawyers may perform an important function in building and maintaining the in- 
stitutional capital of the Executive Branch. If so, then having high-level ten- 
ured lawyers may make the Executive Branch a more effective instrument to 
the advantage of whoever happens to hold the office of the Presidency at any 
given point in time. 
There are at least two mutually reinforcing theories that would explain why 
tenured lawyers might adopt a longer-term perspective than political lawyers, 
and hence why they would be more likely to invest in building and maintaining 
institutional capital. One is grounded in the economics of human capital. 
Employees who have tenure and hence anticipate remaining with their em- 
ployer for many years will rationally adopt a different strategy for investment 
in institution-specific human capital than will employees who anticipate only a 
short term of service.48 This is because tenured employees can foresee reaping 
the benefits of such investment down the road, whether it be in the form of 
greater prestige and power for their office and hence derivatively for them- 
selves, or in terms of fewer hassles in dealing with other institutions, or simply 
in terms of learning shortcuts that allow for more leisure time. 
The other explanation is provided by game theory. It has been shown that 
players in an noncooperative game like the prisoner's dilemma are less likely to 
cooperate when they participate against each other in just one round of the 
game than if they play multiple rounds against each other.49 One-shot players 
tend to pursue a strategy designed to maximize their immediate individual gain, 
whereas repeat players are more apt to pursue a strategy that maximizes pay- 
outs over the long-run. This phenomenon has been used to explain a variety of 
observed behaviors in the law5? and can be used to explain the behavior of gov- 
46. Id. 
47. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (2d ed. 1975). 
48. Cf Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 
92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993) (explaining how tenure affects the optimal investment strategy for employ- 
ees). 
49. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 10 (1984). 
50. For example, the reluctance of parties to long term contracts to litigate disputes over contrac- 
tual terms, see Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
Soc. REV. 55 (1963), and the tendency of neighbors to resolve boundary disputes in accordance with 
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ernment lawyers as well. Political appointees-the "in-and-outers"-are like 
one-shot players who seek immediate payoffs and give relatively little attention 
to long-term institution building. Tenured lawyers are like repeat players who 
adopt a long-term perspective and hence are more likely to devote themselves 
to building and maintaining institutional capital.51 
Institutional capital in this context has several dimensions. One is com- 
monly referred to as "institutional memory." In any governmental office, his- 
tory has deposited many layers of past decisions, which leave behind them dif- 
ferent degrees of settled practices. As many a short-termer will attest, the 
senior civil servants are an invaluable storehouse of this office lore. Practices 
followed in the past may or may not be optimal solutions to problems. But 
they are usually at least functional solutions, and it is always worth knowing 
that they exist before embarking on a different course. The institutional mem- 
ory of these practices, of which the high-level tenured lawyers are often the sole 
repository, has proven invaluable in preventing many a political lawyer and 
younger civil service lawyer from reinventing the wheel, and in keeping them 
out of trouble. 
Another aspect of institutional capital involves the training and mentoring 
of young lawyers. One would predict, on average, that tenured lawyers will de- 
vote more time and energy to mentoring young lawyers than will political law- 
yers. This is partly because they have more information to impart, and partly 
because they have a larger stake in seeing that younger lawyers learn to per- 
form their jobs properly. Thus, the legal staff serving the President will be bet- 
ter trained if a significant portion of the senior lawyers are tenured than if all 
are political appointees. 
I would like to concentrate, however, on two other claims about how ten- 
ured lawyers function to build and maintain institutional capital that are likely 
to be more controversial. The first is that tenured lawyers are more likely to 
invest in practices that enhance the reputation of the Executive Branch in the 
eyes of other institutional actors. The second is that tenured lawyers are more 
likely consistently to defend the prerogatives of the Executive Branch against 
encroachments by other institutional actors. In making these claims, I will 
draw almost exclusively on illustrations from the Solicitor General's Office, so 
there is necessarily a question about how far my contentions are generalizable 
across the entire range of government offices. 
A. Reputation Building 
The Solicitor General's Office provides some especially good illustrations 
of how tenured lawyers work to build and maintain the reputation of the Ex- 
informal norms, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS ETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991). 
51. The distinction drawn here in terms of game theory is similar to that developed by Marc Gal- 
anter between "one-shot" and "repeat" litigants, used explain litigant behavior. See Marc S. Galanter, 
Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95 
(1974). 
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ecutive Branch with other institutional actors. It is a commonplace that the 
Solicitor General's behavior as a litigant deviates in several significant ways 
from that of every other litigant who appears before the Supreme Court.52 Per- 
haps most importantly, the Solicitor General exercises extreme self-restraint in 
selecting cases to present to the Court for review: Only a small portion of the 
cases that the government loses in the courts of appeals become petitions for 
certiorari. Moreover, the Solicitor General is especially scrupulous to draw the 
Court's attention to facts and precedents adverse to the government's posi- 
tion.53 This affirmative disclosure policy benefits the Court by giving it a more 
accurate picture of the legal dimensions of the case, but would seem to increase 
the odds of the government losing in any particular case where such a disclo- 
sure is made. In addition, the Solicitor General, unlike most other litigants, will 
occasionally acquiesce in another party's petition for certiorari, even if this puts 
at risk a favorable judgment obtained in the lower courts. Finally, and most 
strikingly, the Solicitor General in a very few cases each Term "confesses er- 
ror," and asks the Court to reverse and remand a favorable judgment obtained 
by the government in the lower courts because it is based on an error of law or 
fact or is contrary to Justice Department policy.54 Needless to say, no other liti- 
gant asks the Court to rule against it. 
These behaviors have been cited by commentators for the proposition that 
the Solicitor General has divided loyalties. Some commentators claim that the 
Solicitor General owes a duty of loyalty both to the Executive Branch and di- 
rectly to the Court-hence the moniker the "Tenth Justice."55 Others argue 
more vaguely that the Solicitor General must represent the interests not just of 
the Executive Branch but of the entire "United States,"56 or that the Solicitor 
52. See generally REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 
(1992); CAPLAN, supra note 35. 
53. General rules of legal ethics require that lawyers "disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the 
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not 
disclosed by opposing counsel." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983). 
Lawyers in a private practice, with the acquiescence of courts, often interpret this duty narrowly. See 
Risa B. Lischkoff, Recent Decisions on Citing Authorities to Courts: Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 315, 319 (1994). Lawyers in the Solicitor General's 
office, in my experience, uniformly adopt a generous interpretation of the duty. 
54. See generally David M. Rosenzweig, Note, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the 
Solicitor General, 82 GEO L.J. 2079 (1994). Confession of error in the sense of disclaiming a favorable 
judgment on grounds of miscarriage of justice should be distinguished from cases where the Solicitor 
General refuses to defend a duly-enacted federal statute on the ground that he concludes it is unconsti- 
tutional. Usually this happens when the Solicitor General concludes that the statute interferes with 
executive branch prerogatives. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659 (1988) (Solicitor Gen- 
eral Fried argues for United States against the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions 
of the Ethics in Government Act). But occasionally a Solicitor General will decline to enforce a stat- 
ute on the ground that it has no plausible defense under established principles of constitutional law. 
This has happened, for example, with respect to gender discriminations found in Social Security laws. 
See Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 872, 873 n.2 (1984). 
55. CAPLAN, supra note 35. 
56. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General-Representing the Interests of 
the United States Before the Supreme Court, 34 MO. L. REV. 527, 533 (1969). 
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General has a special duty to uphold and enforce "the law"57 (this being an es- 
pecially quaint pre-Bork notion). 
It is not necessary, however, to adopt any of these theories of divided loy- 
alty in order to explain the Solicitor General's unique litigating behavior. Each 
of the cited anomalies-the self-restraint in seeking certiorari, the affirmative 
disclosure of adverse authority, acquiescence in review, and confession of er- 
ror-are behaviors that enhance the Solicitor General's reputation with the 
Justices for being an "honest broker" or a "straight shooter." Having such a 
reputation undoubtedly increases the degree of overall deference that the 
Court gives the Solicitor General, as reflected in the government's very high 
overall win rates in the Court.58 It also increases the probability that the Court 
will defer to the wishes of the Solicitor General in special circumstances where 
it is especially vital to the incumbent Administration that the Court grant re- 
view or issue a stay in a given case. 
The advantages that come from having a reputation for good faith and hon- 
esty have not been lost on the more thoughtful lawyers who have served as So- 
licitor General. Shortly after he left office Rex Lee observed: 
There has been built up, over 115 years since this office was first created in 1870, a 
reservoir of credibility on which the incumbent Solicitor General may draw to his im- 
mediate adversarial advantage. But if he draws too deeply, too greedily, or too indis- 
criminately, then he jeopardizes not only tl~ot advantage in that particular case, but 
also an important institution of government. 
What has not been noted, to my knowledge, is the connection between 
these reputation-building behaviors and the prevalence of tenured lawyers in 
the Office. Virtually every exercise of self-abnegating behavior originates with 
the civil service appointees-the Assistants to the Solicitor General or the ca- 
reer deputies. The most vivid example is provided by confessions of error. It 
almost never happens that a recommendation to confess error comes from one 
of the litigating divisions, such as the Criminal Division of the Justice Depart- 
ment. The lawyers who tried and won the case in the lower courts are never 
eager to undo their own success. And only rarely does the initiative for con- 
fessing error come either from the Solicitor General or from the Political Dep- 
57. See Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General: The Role of the Solicitor General 1 OP. 
OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 228, 231-32 (1977). 
58. Empirical studies show that the Solicitor General succeeds in getting certiorari granted 70% of 
the time (compared to about eight percent for other litigants); prevails on the merits about 67% of the 
time; and supports the winning side with amicus curiae briefs about 75% of the time. See Jeffrey A. 
Segal, Supreme Court Support for the Solicitor General: The Effect of Presidential Appointments, 43 W. 
POL. Q. 137, 139-40 (1990); see also Steven Puro, The United States as Amicus Curiae, in COURTS, 
LAW AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES 220 (S. Sidney Ulmer ed., 1981); Reginald S. Sheehan et al., Ideology, 
Status, and the Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 
464, 465 (1992). 
59. Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 
595, 601 (1986); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General, 
21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105 (1988). 
TENURED LAWYERS 97 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 13 Nov 2015 21:24:17 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 
uty. Both are usually too busy with higher profile matters to dig into the record 
in the way required to initiate the process of considering a confession of error.6 
What happens in most cases resulting in a confession of error is as follows. 
The case arrives in the Office, usually in the form of a draft opposition to a pe- 
tition for certiorari prepared by the litigating division, and is assigned to a ten- 
ured Assistant. The Assistant studies the draft opposition in light of decision 
and the record below, and discovers what appears to be a miscarriage of law or 
justice. The Assistant then recommends to the relevant Deputy that the gov- 
ernment file a confession of error rather than an opposition. The Deputy 
(typically also a tenured lawyer), will scrutinize such a recommendation skepti- 
cally, recognizing that the litigating division will strongly object to any confes- 
sion of error. But if the Assistant convinces the Deputy that a miscarriage of 
justice has truly occurred, the Deputy will then take the matter to the Solicitor 
General. Often a vigorous discussion tantamount to an oral argument then 
takes place between the tenured lawyers in the Solicitor General's office and 
the lawyers in the litigating division, with the Solicitor General acting as 
"judge." If the tenured lawyers in the Solicitor General's office convince the 
Solicitor General they are right, then the government confesses error. 
It is difficult to imagine this process occurring very often if all lawyers in the 
Solicitor General's office were political appointees. A confession of error al- 
ways generates short-term costs in the form of hard feelings within the De- 
partment. The ability to incur these short-term costs is made possible primarily 
because the tenured Deputy who concurs in the Assistant's recommendation 
(nearly always the Deputy who handles criminal cases) has built up a large 
store house of good will with his or her counterpart in the litigating division. 
The top-level civil service lawyers in the litigating division respect and trust the 
60. A recent exception to this generalization underscores the perils that arise when inexperienced 
political lawyers overrule the career lawyers and insist on an abrupt change in position in the middle of 
a case. Near the beginning of his service as President Clinton's first Solicitor General, Drew Days filed 
a confession of error in a brief on the merits in Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1993), a child por- 
nography conviction. Although the career lawyers in the Bush Administration had argued that the 
conviction should be upheld, Days-reportedly at the urging of his new Political Deputy Paul 
Bender-argued that the lower courts had applied an improperly broad interpretation of the statute. 
See Joan Biskupic, Politics Still Plays a Role in Solicitor General's Office, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1994, 
at Al. According to the new Solicitor General's position, free speech considerations required that the 
"lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" of children be interpreted to mean exhibitions in 
which the genital areas are fully exposed. In the films produced by Knox, by contrast, young girls were 
shown cavorting in tight bathing suits, leotards, or underpants. See Brief for the United States, at 10- 
13, 20-23, Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1993) (No. 92-1183). Upon receiving this confession or 
error, the Court vacated and remanded the conviction for reconsideration by the lower court. 
Days' action was undoubtedly motivated by sincere concerns about free speech values. But it 
proved to be deeply embarrassing to the Clinton Administration. Republicans had a field day sug- 
gesting that the Administration favored coddling child pornographers, and secured a unanimous reso- 
lution in the Senate condemning the new interpretation. See Biskupic, supra note 26. When, on re- 
mand, the Third Circuit rejected the new interpretation and reaffirmed Knox's conviction, Attorney 
General Reno took the highly unusual step of publicly repudiating the Solicitor General's prior posi- 
tion, and signing the opposition to certiorari herself. See David G. Savage & Ronald J. Ostrow, U.S. 
Won't Fight Pornography Conviction, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at A34. The Court then denied cer- 
tiorari without comment. See Knox v. United States, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995). 
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judgment of the tenured Deputy and know that the Deputy is acting with the 
best long-run interests of the litigating division in mind. If everyone involved 
were a political appointee, this basis of trust grounded in long-term interaction 
would be missing, and the short-term political costs would loom much larger. 
A similar if less dramatic story can be told with respect to the other self- 
abnegating behaviors of the Solicitor General's office: self restraint in seeking 
certiorari, affirmative disclosure of adverse facts and authority, and acquies- 
cence in opponents' petitions for certiorari. The tenured lawyers are the key 
participants in producing each of these behaviors. The functional consequence 
of using tenured lawyers, therefore, is that the government adopts litigating be- 
haviors that translate into short-term setbacks or reversals (unusually in insig- 
nificant cases), but the government emerges with an immensely enhanced repu- 
tation for honesty and good faith that translates into powerful litigating 
advantages overall. 
B. Defense of Prerogatives 
The connection between tenured lawyers and defense of executive branch 
prerogatives is less apparent than that with respect to reputation-building. 
Nevertheless, I believe there is a connection here too. Many readers will find 
such a claim to be highly counter-intuitive. The common assumption is that 
only political appointees can be trusted vigorously to defend the prerogatives of 
the President, whereas tenured lawyers will be quick to seek accommodation or 
compromise with the other branches. Yet for reasons analogous to those re- 
garding long-term reputation-building, it may be that tenured lawyers are in 
fact more likely to be steadfast in the defense of the presidency than political 
appointees will be. 
The difficulty of using political lawyers to defend executive branch preroga- 
tives has been acutely analyzed in an important article by Nelson Lund.61 Lund 
describes how President Bush made a conscious decision at the outset of his 
Administration to use the lawyers in the White House Counsel's Office and the 
Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") in the Justice Department vigorously to de- 
fend the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive Branch, which Bush re- 
garded as being under assault by Congress and the courts. To this end, a plan 
was devised that included a much more aggressive use of the veto, presidential 
signing statements, and litigation in an effort to fend off encroachments on 
presidential powers. 
As Lund describes it, the net result of this campaign was largely a disaster. 
Over the course of the next four years, the veto was used only rarely and 
mostly for minor encroachments;62 warnings delivered in signing statements 
were not followed up with action;63 the Administration ended up defending in 
61. See generally Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17. 
62. See id. at 40-43, 63-64. 
63. See id. 
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court the most serious encroachments on the President's authority;64 and the 
separation-of-powers team precipitated a judicial confrontation over the inde- 
pendence of the Post Office that backfired badly and ended up eroding presi- 
dential prerogatives.65 
Lund's explanation for this dismal record is in effect that political lawyers 
are too preoccupied with short-term consequences to engage in long-term insti- 
tution building. He notes that the rewards for defending presidential preroga- 
tives 
would mostly be reaped at some remote period of time, after the defenders of the 
theory had left office. The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the presidency, how- 
ever, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs would include the expen- 
diture of political capital that might have been used for more pressing purposes, the 
unpleasantness of increased friction with congressional barons and their allies, and 
the sheer expenditure of time by extremely busy people on uninvitingly dry legal is- 
sues. 
In short, political lawyers cannot be expected to make significant invest- 
ments in long-term defense of the presidency for the same reason that tenants 
holding year-to-year leases cannot be expected to make significant improve- 
ments in land: The costs would be fully internalized by the improver while the 
benefits would largely be externalized to someone else. 
If Lund's diagnosis of the problem is correct, then this suggests that tenured 
lawyers may again be part of the solution. My own experience in the govern- 
ment suggests that there are at least some occasions when tenured lawyers will 
weigh in more vigorously to support executive prerogative than political law- 
yers. Of course, they will not often (or even usually) prevail. Controversies 
that implicate the defense of presidential prerogatives-in contrast to those 
that lead to confessions of error, acquiescences, and the like-are often high- 
profile disputes that attract the close attention of the political lawyers and even 
cabinet officers and the President. Consequently, the tenured lawyers are more 
likely to be overruled in cases involving defense of presidential prerogatives. 
Nevertheless, I believe that the input of the tenured lawyers in these controver- 
sies may have a salutary influence in keeping the longer-range issues in the 
forefront of the discussion. 
An illustration of this phenomenon occurred during my tenure in the Solici- 
tor General's office in the late 1980s. It involved what is usually the most rou- 
tine task performed by the Solicitor General's office: authorizing an appeal 
from a federal district court to the court of appeals. In such matters, the rec- 
ommendation of the staff is nearly always accepted by the Solicitor General. In 
very rare cases, the Solicitor General's decision will be challenged by a disap- 
pointed Department or agency, in which case it may be resolved by the Deputy 
Attorney General or even the Attorney General. In this particular case, the 
64. See id. at 70-79. 
65. See id. at 79-83; see also Neal Devins, Tempest in an Envelope: Reflections on the Bush White 
House's Failed Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1035 (1994). 
66. Lund, supra note 61, at 35. 
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Solicitor General's decision in favor of an appeal was challenged by the State 
Department all the way to the desk of President Ronald Reagan. 
The case involved an appropriations rider called the "Anti-Terrorism Act 
of 1987," which in unequivocal terms required that the Palestine Liberation 
Organization's ("PLO's") observer-mission to the United Nations be closed.67 
After President Reagan signed the Act into law, the Civil Division of the Jus- 
tice Department dutifully filed suit in federal court in the Southern District of 
New York seeking an injunction closing the mission. Nothwithstanding the un- 
ambiguous legislative mandate, Judge Palmieri denied the requested relief.68 
Judge Palmieri reasoned that the PLO had a customary right to maintain the 
observer-mission under the United Nations Headquarters Agreement,69 an in- 
ternational treaty ratified by the United States, and that Congress could not 
pass a law abrogating a provision in an international treaty unless the statute 
expressly acknowledged the conflict with international law. 
The Civil Division recommended that this decision be appealed to the Sec- 
ond Circuit. In the Division's view, the Headquarters Agreement did not es- 
tablish the PLO's right to maintain an observer-mission, and even if it had, 
there is no requirement that Congress expressly acknowledge it is abrogating a 
treaty provision before unambiguous legislation inconsistent with a treaty will 
be given effect. The State Department opposed an appeal. The Department 
placed primary reliance on the damage to U.S. foreign relations that would be 
ensue if the U.S., as the host nation to the United Nations, unilaterally expelled 
a foreign entity to which the United Nations had granted observer status. 
It was in this posture that the matter arrived in the Solicitor General's Of- 
fice. What was odd about the appeal request, from the perspective of the ten- 
ured lawyers in the Solicitor General's Office, was that the papers gave no con- 
sideration to the constitutional concerns raised by a congressional enactment 
directing the President to shut down a diplomatic mission in the United States. 
Under the Constitution, the President is given the power to "receive Ambassa- 
dors and other public Ministers,"71 and this has been understood to give the 
President broad and exclusive power to determine what sort of diplomatic 
agents may enter the country.72 The Anti-Terrorism Act appeared to usurp this 
67. 22 U.S.C. ? 5202 (1994). The Act, which is still on the books, makes it unlawful: 
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to establish or maintain an office, head- 
quarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United 
States at the behest of or direction of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents 
thereof. 
Id. The Attorney General is directed to "take the necessary steps and institute the necessary legal ac- 
tion to effectuate the policies and provisions of this chapter." Id. at ? 5203(a). 
68. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
69. See id. at 1465-68. 
70. See id. at 1468-71. 
71. U.S. CONST. art II, ? 3. 
72. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) (noting in dictum that 
President has exclusive authority to recognize foreign governments); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ? 204 (1987). 
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function insofar as agents of the PLO were concerned. Yet the political law- 
yers in the Civil Division gave no weight to the adverse precedent that would 
be created for future claims of presidential control over diplomacy by promi- 
nently seeking an appellate decision vindicating a congressional directive to 
close a diplomatic mission. The precedent was especially problematic given 
that the State Department seemed to be saying that closure of the PLO mission 
was contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States. 
In fact, from the time the Anti-Terrorism Act was passed, it was primarily 
the tenured lawyers within the Justice Department who gave voice to the con- 
stitutional concerns presented by the Act. Staff lawyers in the Office of Legal 
Counsel raised the constitutional issue immediately after the Act was passed. 
This resulted in some cautionary language being included in President Rea- 
gan's signing statement, but did not dissuade the Civil Division from seeking an 
injunction enforcing the Act. When the Civil Division sought authority to ap- 
peal Judge Palmieri's decision, staff lawyers in the Solicitor General's office 
raised the issue once again. This time the issue did not go away. Solicitor Gen- 
eral Fried eventually authorized an appeal, but added the significant qualifica- 
tion that an such appeal could be forgone if the President was willing to state 
that enforcement of the Anti-Terrorism would be unconstitutional as applied to 
the PLO mission-a step that would require formal notification of Congress.73 
Heartened by Fried's equivocation, the State Department asked the Attor- 
ney General to overrule the appeal authorization. The Attorney General de- 
clined. Secretary of State George Shultz then took the matter to the Presi- 
dent.74 The day the notice of appeal was due to be filed, President Reagan 
overruled the Attorney General and Fried, and decided against an appeal.75 
The President did not state, as Fried had thought was required, that he was in- 
voking his Article II authority to disregard a statute that violated presidential 
prerogatives. Thus, this was hardly the finest hour for the bold defense of the 
presidency. Essentially, the President was hiding behind the legal reasoning of 
Judge Palimieri, which every senior lawyer in the Justice Department regarded 
as untenable. 
On the other hand, the decision not to appeal avoided creating a stronger 
precedent that would legitimize congressional efforts to interfere with diplo- 
matic missions that the President did not wish to close. For this, the tenured 
lawyers in the Justice Department may deserve some small credit. Their ar- 
ticulation of the constitutional objections to an appeal provided a legal argu- 
73. Each year, in its annual appropriation of funds for the Justice Department, Congress requires 
the Attorney General to notify both Houses of Congress whenever the Attorney General concludes in 
a contested case that a statute of the United States cannot be defended on constitutional grounds. See 
28 U.S.C. ? 519 (1994) (note). 
74. See Robert Pear, U.S. Officials Split over Whether to Appeal Ruling on P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 28,1988, at A5. 
75. See John M. Goshko, PLO Mission to Stay Open; U.S. Won't Appeal Ruling; Decision Based 
on Foreign Policy Considerations, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1988, at A2; Norman Kempster, U.S. Drops 
Effort to Oust PLO's U.N. Mission in N.Y., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, ? 1 at 1; Robert Pear, U.S. Will 
Allow P.L.O. to Maintain Its Office at U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, Al. 
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ment lending credibility to the State Department's purely prudential concerns. 
I have no idea what weight, if any, the President and his advisers gave to the 
constitutional implications of an appeal. It is possible that they were a factor in 
the discussions, which is more than could be said of the situation when the re- 
quest for authority to appeal first emerged from the front office of the Civil Di- 
vision. 
Why might tenured lawyers be more concerned with preserving the Presi- 
dent's constitutional prerogatives than political lawyers? On the face of the 
matter, it appears mysterious. Yet the political reality that unlocks the mystery 
was in fact reasonably clear to everyone involved in the internal discussions. 
The political lawyers were responding to the same forces that had energized the 
members of Congress who had voted for the Anti-Terrorism Act, namely, that 
there was more political support to be garnered by taking a hard line against 
the PLO. Specifically, the America-Israel Political Action Committee 
("AIPAC") was at that time on a crusade to get the United States to isolate the 
PLO diplomatically and had made closure of the United Nations mission its top 
priority.76 Ambitious political animals in Washington had good reason to want 
to stay on the good side of AIPAC, which had enough influence to be able to 
advance or thwart future political careers.7 
The tenured-lawyers, in contrast, could care less what AIPAC thought 
about the PLO. Their perspective was institutional. They were concerned that 
a high-visibility appeal seeking to enforce the statute would create an impor- 
tant precedent ratifying Congress's intrusion into presidential diplomacy. 
Given their independence from short-term political considerations, they had 
greater incentive to stand up for the President's constitutional powers than the 
political lawyers did. 
The moral of this story is obviously not that tenured lawyers will always 
protect presidential prerogatives. Presidential prerogatives will often be chal- 
lenged in cases, like the closure of the PLO mission, with high political stakes, 
and the political lawyers will have the last word in such cases. It does not fol- 
low from this, however, that tenured lawyers exert no influence in support of 
presidential prerogatives. It was my experience that tenured lawyers are highly 
sensitive to the need to protect presidential prerogatives. After all, this is the 
ultimate source of their own authority and prestige. And it was my experience 
that tenured lawyers are often far more steadfast in their support of these pre- 
rogatives than are the "in-and-outers." So, although the use of tenured lawyers 
cannot guarantee the defense of presidential prerogatives, it nevertheless 
makes a positive contribution toward that end. 
76. See E.A. Wayne, U.S. Searches for a Way Around Law That Will Close PLO Office, CHRIST. 
SCI. MON., Jan. 13, 1988, at 5; Ending an Embarrassment, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1988, at 6. 
77. John Bolton, who was the head of the Civil Division at the time, had ambitions to secure a 
high-level diplomatic post. He was later was nominated and confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State 
in the Bush Administration. 
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C. Institutional Capital in the Balance 
I have suggested that tenured lawyers contribute to the institutional capital 
of the Executive Branch in a variety of ways. They provide a source of institu- 
tional memory, and are more likely to mentor young lawyers. More controver- 
sially, they may be more likely to engage in behaviors that enhance the reputa- 
tion of the Executive Branch in the eyes of other institutional actors and may 
be more stalwart in their defense of executive branch prerogatives than are po- 
litical lawyers. These justifications for tenured lawyers strike me as more pow- 
erful than the impartiality justification, at least in an era that has suffered a loss 
of faith in the ability of lawyers to discover the law independent of political 
considerations. 
To say that there is a justification for having tenured lawyers does not, how- 
ever, mean that every lawyer who serves in the government should be tenured. 
Political lawyers, who are much more sensitive to the policy preferences of 
elected officials, introduce an important element of democratic accountability 
that would be missing if all lawyers were life-long civil servants. And any sys- 
tem of tenure creates inefficiencies in the form of the increased opportunities 
for shirking. The point, rather, is that there is an optimal mix of political law- 
yers and tenured lawyers. If we focus only on the impartiality justification, it 
might seem that the optimal mix would call for an expansion of the ranks of 
political lawyers, because this ensures greater political accountability and effi- 
ciency, and no one puts much stock in impartiality these days. However, once 
we introduce the contributions that tenured lawyers make toward building and 
maintaining institutional capital, including the reputation of the Executive 
Branch and defending executive branch prerogatives, then the optimal mix ap- 
pears to shift back in the direction of using relatively more tenured lawyers. 
IV 
REPLACING THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL WITH TENURED LAWYERS 
I will close with some observations about how the foregoing framework ap- 
plies to what is undoubtedly the most controversial issue of our time regarding 
the role of government lawyers: the investigation and prosecution of alleged 
criminal activity by high-level executive branch officials. 
The current system for handling this problem is set forth in the Ethics in 
Government Act.78 The Act is a product of post-Watergate suspicion of all 
things governmental. It calls for the appointment of Independent Counsels 
who operate outside the supervision of the Justice Department. If the Attor- 
ney General receives an allegation of possible criminal activity by a high-level 
executive official, the Attorney General must seek the appointment of an In- 
dependent Counsel if there are "reasonable grounds to believe that further in- 
78. 28 U.S.C. ? 591-599 (1994). For an overview of the Act's current provisions, see John Q. Bar- 
rett, All or Nothing, or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney General Power, Conduct, and Judgment in Rela- 
tion to the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49 MERCER L. REV. 519 (1998). 
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vestigation is warranted."79 The actual appointment of the Independent Coun- 
sel is made by a special panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, which also defines the Independent Counsel's ju- 
risdiction.80 Once appointed, the Independent Counsel can be dismissed by the 
Attorney General only "for good cause," in which case the dismissal is subject 
to judicial review.81 Otherwise, the special panel determines when the Inde- 
pendent Counsel's investigation is over. 
To say that this system has worked badly is a considerable understatement.82 
Without suggesting that every investigation shares all these shortcomings, there 
is a general consensus that the current system results in the following problems, 
among others: too many criminal investigations of top executive officials;83 
criminal investigations into alleged misdeeds that would ordinarily be regarded 
as too trivial to warrant prosecution; investigations that drag on for an inordi- 
nate length of time; extraordinarily expensive investigations running into tens 
of millions of dollars; routine charges that the investigators are politically mo- 
tivated and countercharges that investigated are engaged in obstruction of jus- 
tice; the erosion of norms surrounding the confidentiality of grand jury investi- 
gations; and a general poisoning of the Washington political climate caused by 
the criminalization of ordinary political disagreements. 
How could such a well-intentioned statute produce such an unfortunate set 
of results? The one problem would seem to be that the Act single-mindedly 
pursues the goal of impartiality at the expense of all accountability. As sug- 
gested earlier, in structuring the duties of high-level government lawyers, there 
is always a tradeoff between impartiality and accountability. The more inde- 
pendent the lawyer, the less accountable. Sacrificing all accountability in this 
context would make sense only if in doing so we could obtain true impartiality. 
But the function of investigating criminal accusations directed at high-level 
politicians is not an activity that is susceptible to objectively determinable, po- 
litically neutral, right answers. Alleged crimes like perjury or obstruction of 
justice-the usual grist for the independent counsel mill-will always entail a 
subjective element, in which prosecutorial judgment must be exercised in de- 
ciding whether charges should be brought. Thus, the Act's quest for the com- 
pletely independent lawyer to decide whether to bring criminal charges against 
high-ranking executive officials is fundamentally misconceived. 
79. See id. ? 592(c)(l)(A). 
80. See id. ? 593(b)(3). 
81. See id. ? 596(a)(1), (3). 
82. For earlier reviews of the problems created by the Act, see TERRY EASTLAND, ETHICS, 
POLITICS AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 121-135 (1989); KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT 
JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 117-167 (1992). More re- 
cently, even erstwhile ardent supporters have expressed their doubts. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Curb- 
ing Special Counsels, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at A37. 
83. See Katy J. Harriger, The History of the Independent Counsel Provisions: How the Past Informs 
the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489, 515 (1998) ("Before 1978 there were three scandals 
deemed worthy of independent investigation. Since the passage of the Act, there have been nineteen 
with the campaign finance issue left to be resolved."). 
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We have also learned by now-or should have learned by now-that mak- 
ing the Independent Counsel completely unaccountable actually weakens the 
institution. There was a taste of this with Lawrence Walsh's investigation of 
the Iran-Contra affair, as Republicans lashed out at Walsh for conducting a bi- 
ased investigation designed to influence the 1992 elections, and Walsh never 
seemed fully to regain his public standing. But the Clinton White House's 
strategy for attacking Kenneth Starr's investigations have fully revealed the 
fallacy of relying on a totally independent prosecutor. Starr has been subjected 
to a relentless White House attack on his motives and methods. Because he 
has no electoral mandate, these attacks have been highly successful. A high 
percentage of the public evidently regards Starr's investigation as the product 
of a "right-wing conspiracy" bent on upsetting the results of a national election. 
A prosecutor who is accountable to elected public officials would be less vul- 
nerable to this kind of campaign. 
Exactly how accountable we should make the lawyers that investigate alle- 
gations of high-level executive crimes is a more difficult question. It would 
make no sense to make such lawyers immediately accountable to the President, 
by, for example, putting the investigative function in the White House Coun- 
sel's office. This would assure that no politically embarrassing criminal activity 
would ever come to light. On the other hand, it is important that those who 
control "perhaps the most potent weapon the government can wield against a 
private citizen-the power to bring criminal charges" should be answerable, at 
least indirectly, to elected public officials.84 The proper solution would seem to 
require some compromise between independence and accountability. 
What is less recognized is that the Ethics in Government Act, in its pursuit 
of extreme independence, creates a second problem: It ignores the importance 
of the values that I have associated with the institutional capital justification for 
tenured lawyers. This was perceived many years ago in a commentary written 
by two former Deputy Solicitor Generals, Andy Frey and Ken Geller. Nothing 
that has transpired in recent years undermines the wisdom of their perceptions: 
Because each independent counsel is appointed on an ad hoc basis for the limited 
purpose of investigating specific allegations against one individual or a small group of 
individuals, his decisions are made without resort to any institutional memory and 
without the ability (or the need) to place a case within the broader framework that 
has evolved in the course of exercising prosecutorial discretion in large numbers of 
cases.... 
A seasoned federal prosecutor in the handling of numerous criminal cases acquires a 
sense of perspective, fairness[,] and judgment, which a one-shot prosecutor necessar- 
ily lacks.... [T]he objective of the exercise should be to apply the normal standards 
of investigation and prosecution evenhandedly to those in high government circles 
(taking into account that it may be appropriate to hold such individuals to a some- 
what higher standard of conduct), not to loose on them some avenging angel free 
from traditional constraints on the exercise of the prosecutive power. 
84. See Andrew L. Frey & Kenneth S. Geller, Better Than Independent Counsels, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 14,1988, at C7. 
85. Id. 
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In other words, the Independent Counsel is an "in-and-outer." He or she 
has little or no incentive to abide by Justice Department policies, to adhere to 
traditional prosecutorial norms that have evolved over time, to conserve re- 
sources, to wrap-up business expeditiously, or to preserve principles like the 
confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. 
In effect then, the Ethics in Government Act manages to combine the worst 
features of political lawyers and tenured lawyers. It creates an office that lacks 
political accountability and is prone to inefficiencies-the problems associated 
with tenured lawyers. Yet it also creates an office having the short time hori- 
zons and lack of institutional memory associated with political lawyers. No 
wonder the Act has been such a disaster for our polity. 
Since the Act gives us the worst of all possible worlds, there are many ways 
to improve it, including outright repeal. One suggestion that merits further 
consideration would be to confer the function of investigating executive crimes 
upon an office of high-level tenured lawyers in the Justice Department. 
This is not the time and place to spell out the details of how such an office 
might be organized. The general idea would be to create an office of career 
prosecutors within the Criminal Division of the Justice Department who would 
devote themselves full-time to the investigation of allegations of high-level 
criminal activity by elected politicians. All lawyers in this office would be ten- 
ured civil servants, and all would be required to log a certain minimum number 
of years as line prosecutors, ideally spanning multiple administrations, before 
they would be appointed to the special office. They would be the quintessential 
"lifers"-professional prosecutors thoroughly imbued with the norms of their 
trade and having no aspirations for private employment or political advance- 
ment. 
I see no constitutional reason why the head of this office could not also be a 
tenured lawyer.86 When Frey and Geller made a similar proposal in 1988, they 
assumed that such an office would have to be headed by a presidential ap- 
pointee. But this was before the Supreme Court, in Morrison v. Olson,87 re- 
jected the Appointments Clause and other serious constitutional challenges 
mounted against the independent counsel idea. If an Independent Counsel ap- 
pointed by an Article III court is constitutional, then an office of public investi- 
gations headed by a tenured Justice Department lawyer is constitutional. Cer- 
tainly, there would be no constitutional problem presented in having such an 
office headed by a tenured lawyer, as long as the Attorney General (or some 
other accountable official) could reassign the particular tenured lawyer serving 
as the head of the office and replace them with another tenured lawyer. 
86. Making the head of this office both tenured and permanent would run the risk of creating an- 
other J. Edgar Hoover, who could collect embarrassing information about elected politicians and use it 
to build an independent political empire. Thus, some type of rotation or term limits for the head of the 
office-who would nevertheless retain his or her tenure rights to continued employment elsewhere in 
the government-might be desirable. 
87. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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The basic point is that high-level tenured lawyers can serve important and 
useful purposes, and one of them may be getting us out of the independent 
counsel mess.88 What is needed is an investigative office that strikes the right 
balance between accountability and independence, has significant accumulated 
experience in reviewing multiple cases of alleged political corruption, is popu- 
lated with individuals who have no aspirations for higher office, knows how to 
function under a fixed budget, and will aspire to build a reputation for the 
highest standards of integrity. The time-tested device for achieving these sorts 
of objectives is to staff the office heavily with high-level tenured lawyers. Like 
other human contrivances, tenured lawyers are not perfect. But they have 
some important strengths, and those strengths are sorely needed if we are to 
escape from the dysfunctions created by the Ethics in Government Act. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Debates over the future of the civil service are usually couched in terms of a 
trade-off between accountability and impartiality. If that were all at stake, I 
would tend to take the accountability side, at least insofar as government law- 
yers are concerned. To put the matter in the larger framework so ably devel- 
oped by my colleague Steve Calabresi in this symposium, government lawyers 
must serve as "advocates" and "ambassadors" for the incumbent Administra- 
tion's political/legal viewpoints, and these roles surely require a strong dose of 
accountability-stronger than one ever gets from tenured lawyers.89 
I have argued, however, that there should be another dimension to the de- 
bate: what might be called the trade-off between transience and stability. High- 
level tenured lawyers bring a long-term perspective to legal problems that is 
lacking in political lawyers. This long-term perspective generates various forms 
of institutional capital associated with the values of predictability, consistency, 
protection of reliance interests, and respect for tradition. 
These values are especially important in matters of government. Govern- 
ment ultimately rests on coercion. With the threat of coercion in the back- 
ground, legal arguments will be more persuasive if they are leavened with a 
healthy respect for continuity with the past. Thus, political lawyers will per- 
form more effectively if they are backstopped by high-level tenured lawyers, 
who bring with them a natural tendency to promote continuity. This enhanced 
effectiveness applies, moreover, regardless of which function political lawyers 
are asked to perform-including advocating the President's constitutional vi- 
sion. 
88. Cf. Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988) 
(addressing primarily the mess in constitutional law created by the Supreme Court's decision uphold- 
ing the independent counsel statute, but also the mess it has created for our political system). 
89. Steven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution: A Brief Positive 
Account of the Role of Government Lawyers in the Development of Constitutional Law, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (Winter 1998). 
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